

Understanding India's National Security Objectives through Indian Sources

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Security Studies

By

Amrit Ben Grant Bagia, M.A.

Washington, DC
April 15, 2011

UMI Number: 1491291

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 1491291

Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

Copyright 2011 by Amrit Ben Grant Bagia
All Rights Reserved

UNDERSTANDING INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES THROUGH INDIAN SOURCES

Amrit Ben Grant Bagia, M.A.

Thesis Advisor: C. Christine Fair, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

How does India conceptualize its national security objectives and how have these objectives changed over time in light of events over the last twelve years? Raja C. Mohan argues that Indian national security objectives, and foreign policy more broadly, is best conceptualized as three concentric circles consisting of the immediate South Asian “neighborhood,” the “extended neighborhood” and finally, the global stage. My thesis will test the validity of Mohan’s theory using Indian strategic planning documents from the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defense annual reports from 1999 to today.

To my parents who taught me the most important lesson:

“Cowards die many times before their deaths;
The valiant never taste of death but once.”

- *Shakespeare*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	1
Chapter I Methodology and Analytical Approach.....	4
Chapter II Background.....	9
Chapter III Literature Review	13
Chapter IV Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defense Document Analyses	20
Chapter V Implications	40
Appendix A.....	52
Appendix B.....	53
Bibliography	54

INTRODUCTION

An important debate exists about the determinants of India's posited rise. There is a diverse spectrum of opinions from notable South Asian theorists; at one extreme authors like Raja C. Mohan or Stephen Cohen argue that India has been on a clear upward trajectory since the 1998 detonation of its nuclear weapon. In contrast Ramesh Thakur writing just before India's explosion into the nuclear power club argued against the likelihood of a rising India. A vast majority of Indian focused scholarship has emphasized a qualified analysis of a slowly rising India. For example, Harsh Pant's analysis of a clumsy and unguaranteed rise of the South Asian democracy occupies a large swath of popular scholarship on India. Pant argues that India's main challenge in the coming decades is its lack of a coherent national security strategy and culture of foreign policy debating. His conviction stems from a core assumption about India's strategic vision: that it doesn't have one.

In contrast Mohan posits that India does have a grand strategy and a set of observable national security objectives and concludes this by looking at speeches, parliamentary debates and India's behavior with allies and enemies over many decades to demonstrate India's clear strategic objectives. Unlike the United States, however, India does not have a formalized strategic review process. Mohan concludes that New Delhi's national security objectives are subdivided into "three concentric circles"; India's immediate neighborhood, its extended neighborhood, and the global stage. While these three levels of analysis will be explored in depth, the significance of Mohan's assertion rests not only on the claim that India does have clear strategic

objectives but that these objectives have changed as India increasingly began to conceptualize itself as a rising power.

Although few of the theorists mentioned above believe that India's rise is assured, many recognize that India is beginning to play a more significant role in the international system. As India begins to acquire more influence in the international arena, the type of power it plans to be and how the new power is exercised is of considerable import. If India does rise, what kind of power will it be? What are New Delhi's strategic calculations and how does it define its current security environment? Finally, what do India's strategic planning documents over the past decade tell us about India's national security objectives? These questions are of critical importance to security scholars and scholars of international relations and are the central questions that underpin my analysis.

I will test Mohan's thesis using previously under-utilized primary sources. The current corpus of literature relies overwhelmingly on Indian military, economic, and political actions but fails to utilize Indian primary sources, published foreign policy documents. By analyzing the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) annual reports, I hope to shed new light on the utility of Indian planning documents as indicators of Indian foreign policy objectives.

Chapter I of this thesis describes the data and methods used to answer the central research question in addition to a brief note on data caveats. In Chapter II I provide background information on India's ministries, their functions and the role of bureaucracy. Chapter III reviews the current literature on India's posited rise and

includes a more robust discussion of Pant and Mohan's competing theories. Chapter IV provides an in-depth analysis of the MEA and subsequently, the MOD reports from 1999–2010. Chapter IV will also look at both how India's foreign policy objectives have changed over time and what overarching consistencies can be identified. Finally, in Chapter V I draw some broad conclusions about the utility of Indian foreign policy documents in understanding India's foreign policy objectives. In addition, I highlight some of the challenges and tradeoffs that India will likely face in light of the foreign policy objectives that are outlined in the MEA and MOD reports.

CHAPTER I: METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTIC APPROACH

This section details the data used for my research, the methods of my approach and concludes with caveats I have identified in the data and methods.

Data

The primary data I use for the purposes of understanding India's national security objectives are the annual MEA and MOD reports. These reports are arguably the closest proximity of interagency documents that reflect India's strategic concerns in the absence of a formalized strategic review process.

While India does not have a similar strategic review process to the United States, the annual MEA reports reflect an interagency process through which national security objectives are delineated. The MOD reports, not only outline the proverbial "wish list" of India's defense services but also clearly articulates the security environment in which New Delhi finds itself. Together these documents serve to elucidate how India conceptualizes of its central security concerns and how these perceptions have changed from 1999 to 2010. Contrary to divining India's concerns solely from actions, incorporating an analysis of Indian primary sources will offer a greater understanding of India's national security objectives. A more thorough review of the interagency process is outlined in the background section.

The time frame for this analysis will be from 1999 to 2010, which in part is due primarily to the availability of the data. Also, the reviews have been published online and in English spanning 1999 to 2010. Although this time period is based on

availability, it is an acceptable period as it reflects India's national security objectives directly after the first overt and successful nuclear tests of May 1998, the reciprocal tests of Pakistan a few weeks later, and but also before the critical Kargil War .¹ The subsequent reports also deal with post-Kargil, both pre- and post-9/11, and pre- and post-Mumbai in 2008. Although these are not the only critical developments in recent Indian national security challenges they do present a diverse and relevant time frame for current national security objectives. I hypothesize that changes in Indian national security objectives are the most visible after these events which have had dramatic and lasting effects on Indian security concerns.

Methods

The research method I employed was primary source, document analysis with supplemental research on secondary sources, such as academic literature. While the central locus of my research will be the text of the reports, events and actions will be considered to contextualize the analysis. The methodology and model of my approach is similar to that used by Walter Ladwig in his article "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine." Ladwig uses a combination of speeches by Indian policymakers as well as Indian military actions to understand the origins, implications, and challenges of the Cold Start Doctrine. Rather than rely solely on speeches to understand Indian military doctrine as Ladwig does, I will utilize the

¹ The significance of the Kargil War is not only that it was the first military exchange between nuclear armed India and Pakistan but it was significant in retrospect given that India and Pakistan, while politically entering a 'warming' phase, Pakistan was tacitly supporting a militant incursion. The Indo-Pak relationship was 'ahead of the curve' in the decade of terrorism, Kargil was only one example of India's accusations regarding militant activity in Pakistan pre-9/11.

published annual reports (in addition to the speeches and internal debates used by other authors as context) to understand the national security objectives more broadly.

Mohan's analysis of Indian grand strategy is the foundation my analysis. He uses the terms "grand strategy, strategic vision, strategic goals and foreign policy" interchangeably in his analysis of the "three concentric circles" of India's strategic objectives. While the terms can be differentiated, for the purposes of this analysis Mohan's phraseology will be adopted for continuity.

Throughout the paper I employ the term "national security objectives" to denote India's conceptualization of its national security environment, while the challenges and the solutions are encompassed in the term "security objectives." The goals and the policy prescriptions are understood in the context of Indian planning documents and are therefore self-reflective. This definition is beneficial for the purposes of this study because it aims to derive how India understands its own security objectives, in contrast to relying solely on externally derived definitions. How the United States or how Pakistan understands Indian security objectives will be inherently different from how India defines them. For this paper I am primarily interested in Indian definitions of its own foreign policy.²

The past decade has posed some key security challenges for Indian strategic considerations. This includes becoming a nuclear weapon state, the attacks on 9/11 and the increasing international attention on transnational terrorism, approaching the brink

² By using the term "India" in the context of strategic planning, there is some inherent contradiction that the proportional role of elites in formulating policy is significant even though India is a democracy.

of war with Pakistan in 2001–2002, the 2006 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal, and the Mumbai attacks in 2008. How these events have shaped the language used in Indian foreign policy documents will serve as an indication of how India will continue to balance the challenges of foreign policy objectives with the requisites of being a rising power.

Data Caveats

The primary data I use for the purposes of understanding India's national security objectives are the annual MEA and MOD reports. These reports are the closest proximity of interagency documents to reflect India's strategic concerns in the absence of a formalized strategic review process. The MEA and MOD reports that were available online on the Government of India Web Site begin only in 1999 and continue through today, which limited the number of such reports that could be evaluated. While the reports are issued in both Hindi and English, I did not read the Hindi language versions; therefore there may be some alternate data I am not privy to in the Hindi documents.

The analysis may be limited due to the heavy reliance on official documents. Since the analysis was based on government documents, my conclusions may actually be projecting what the Indian government wants to project with respect to its foreign policy considerations. Although Indian actions were considered and are reflected retrospectively in each report, my thesis focuses primarily on Indian intentions and calculations over and above their actions. In doing so, I am assuming that India's intentions are important both in the planning process and also in the eventual

implementation of foreign policies. Nevertheless, the planning documents are one useful indicator (out of potentially many) for how India perceives its national security environment and its foreign policy objectives.

CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

In order to assess the contribution of the annual MEA and MOD reports to the debates about India's posited rise, it is first imperative to offer some insight on India's foreign policy bureaucracy. I will then address why India's foreign policy intentions do not always match implementation.

Ministerial Functions and Indian Bureaucracy

The Indian bureaucratic system is at once a relic of British Imperial rule and an example of India's sovereign evolution. Based largely on the British legacy, India's parliamentary system is somewhat of a hybrid approach that strongly incorporates a cabinet style rule. Composed of the traditional democratic "checks and balances" system, which divides governmental power between an executive, legislative, and judicial branch, the Indian system of governance is both a familiar construct to western scholars and a complex, paradoxical adaptation of the imperial legacy.³

India's executive branch is centered on the president, a largely symbolic figurehead and prime minister (PM), with whom most of the powers of decision making reside. The PM is the head of parliament and his/her power is vested in the support of the constituent parliamentarians. The Parliament forms the legislative branch, comprised of the Lok Sabha (lower house) and Rajya Sabha (upper house). The PM and the ministers of the major governmental departments are accountable to the democratically elected lower house, whose confidence in turn empowers them to

³ See Nair "The Indian Bureaucratic System" pg 1-4 and see Chapter II in Beener "The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy" for discussions on the British legacy on foreign policy bureaucracy in India.

govern. The Indian system is an exception to the traditional parliamentary system in that the parliament does not formulate policy, although it does hold debates on policy. The PM, his chosen council of ministers (the Cabinet) and his personal advisors largely formulate policy and then seek approval from the parliament. Thus, although accountable to “the people,” the PM’s office defines the agenda, suggests policy, and then the ministers actually implement the policy.⁴

Why deeds don’t always match policies

Conventionally, India’s governing process is considered a bureaucratic behemoth; infamous for red tape, a bloated civil service, and paralyzing procedural practices. Upon deeper analysis, however, India’s bureaucracy is somewhat of a duality; while, the civil service including the state level civil servants, police and railway workers⁵ may fit the common stereotype, India’s foreign policy branches are in fact plagued not just by inefficiency but also a dearth of personnel. With only 300 civil servants and 600 Foreign Service officers⁶ occupying the crucial spots within the MEA, each officer is tasked with a portfolio that is notably expansive. Yet, the diminutive number of staff that forms the nucleus of Indian foreign policy implementation is in fact expansive in comparison to those who actually formulate the policies themselves.

Although the Indian government is designed to mirror the British parliamentary system, most often the Indian PM’s cabinet and special advisors are the true

⁴ See Benner, Nair and Mitra for good surveys of Indian bureaucracy

⁵ Rigzin Samphel “India’s civil service: Battling the babu raj” *The Economist*, March 6, 2008

⁶ According to the MEA legend on organizational structure, <http://meaindia.nic.in/staticfile/organisation.pdf> also see Indian Foreign Service Strength on the GoI website, <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=5002>

decisionmakers in the foreign policy realm. The MEA serves as a microcosmic example of the bureaucratic system that transcends all the ministries. Although clearly hierarchical in organization, the MEA is in fact paralyzed by a lack of delegation. Because the head of each ministry is directly accountable to the Parliament, few tasks or decisions are effectively delegated. In most cases, information is slowly filtered up through the ministries until the minister makes a final decision or takes the matter to the Cabinet.

The interagency process is also obfuscated by the lack of clear guidelines, procedures or practices. The only formalized interagency meeting is carried out by the Cabinet and below this level there are some informal personal exchanges on matters that clearly cross ministerial lines or division lines within the MEA. Nevertheless, the MEA remains central to foreign policymaking (embodied by the minister and his relationship with the PM) and implementation, carried out by both the civil and Foreign Service branches. The MOD is charged with the implementation of policy as dictated by the Cabinet, and other than influence through procurement or budgetary considerations, is not responsible for actual policy formulation. Because of this construct and India's historical legacy of a professionalized but largely apolitical military, the Cabinet and the MEA are considered the primary sources for foreign policy formulation, not the MOD. Nevertheless, the MOD annual reports act as a crucial indicator for the implementation of policy.

Due to the top down nature of the system, few actionable decisions are made within the middle or lower echelons of the MEA (nor the MOD). The accountability of

the ministers to the Parliament has created a system in which few are willing to take an action that has not been thoroughly vetted by the highest authorities. This has led, to some extent, to stagnation of innovative policy and the reoccurrence of bureaucratic inertia. Yet, as the following analysis of the annual reports seeks to demonstrate, the foreign policy apparatus of India is undergoing changes, albeit in a manner that is unfamiliar to most western analysts.

The MEA's annual report is arguably the central foreign policy document produced through an interagency/interdivision process. Where the MEA embodies the diplomatic arm of the foreign policy apparatus, the MOD acts as the military counterpart. Both ministries follow the guidance set forth by the PM and the Cabinet and act as the conveyors of policy to the implementers in their respective ministries. While many analysts of India's foreign policy suggest that the policy is unclear at best and non-existent at worst, the following document analysis will demonstrate that not only has India developed a robust and complex foreign policy through practice, but that the policies and theories that underlay actions can be found in foreign planning documents like the MEA and MOD annual reports. By identifying the consistencies and the changes in the MOD and MEA annual reports over the span of 1998–2010, a clearer understanding of the evolution of Indian foreign policy is presented.

CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW

This section will review the current debate about India's posited rise and foreign policy objectives. Following this the analytic paradigm that serves as the foundation of my analysis will be discussed in-depth.

Indian Strategic Objectives: A Debate

The nexus of this debate can be represented by two alternate extremes of opinion; Mohan who argues that India has a robust and identifiable strategic vision and Pant who argues that India's lack of a coherent strategic culture is what stunts the otherwise possible rise. Mohan asserts that how India projects its strategic culture is in essence, culturally Indian as well. Theorists must not fall into the trap of projecting their own expectations (based largely on their own strategy formulation processes) onto Indian expressions of strategy. Where in the United States one can turn to speeches, policy documents and aptly, the numerous forms of strategic defense reviews in order to derive U.S. strategic policy, India's policies may be harder to identify.

This, however, is not a sufficient condition on which to base the argument of a total lack of strategic culture. For this reason, I employ the MOD and MEA reports in the analysis to demonstrate that, indeed, India does have clearly articulated objectives. Where Mohan argues that India can hold a diverse and complex set of partially contradictory national objectives, Pant believes that India's pursuit of multiple and at times contradictory alliances is inadvisable but also the policy serves as evidence that

New Delhi lacks coherent national security objectives. This question is central to the analysis of India's foreign policy objectives and considerations.

Pant appears to conceptualize strategic calculations from a *realpolitik* position, whereby structural concerns dictate the strategic environment in which decisions are made.⁷ He argues that India has failed to hold meaningful debates in order to determine the challenges of, or solutions to, the current security environment. The absence of these debates and decisions are thus evidence of a lack of coherent foreign policy. Pant expounds his view by first describing some of the key challenges to India's security in the coming decades. These include but are not limited to, the changing structure of the international system, China's rise, nuclear posturing and arms reforms, the myriad challenges of alliance building in the Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran to be specific), and energy security.

Pant explicitly argues that there is an "appreciation in Indian policymaking circles of India's rising capabilities...But all this is happening in an intellectual vacuum with the result that micro issues dominate the foreign policy discourse in the absence of an overarching framework."⁸ Pant believes that divisions among the decision making elites is equal to an overall division on foreign policy. In quoting Walter Lippman, Pant supports the claim that this division will result in the inability to "prepare adequately for war or to safeguard successfully its peace."⁹ Perhaps the principle is true, if a state is indecisive and fails to follow a coherent policy it may in the end be counterproductive

⁷ Harsh V. Pant , "A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2009 pg 6

⁸ Ibid pg 16

⁹ Walter Lippman as quoted by Pant, pg 16

to achieving its goals. Pant, however, fails to convincingly demonstrate that India is failing to engage in these debates.

In contradiction to his own assertion Pant writes, "...Indian foreign policy strategists increasingly see their country as a great power in the making and are more ambitious than ever before in defining Indian interests..."¹⁰ He later describes a level of surprising continuity in foreign policy decisions between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the newly elected Congress Party.¹¹ Despite two very different groups of elites coming to some form of consensus on foreign policy, Pant continues to assert that "Indian policy stands divided on fundamental foreign policy choices."¹² Whether or not this can be explained by the nature of democracies in general, which are inherently and vocally competitive or if indeed, this is a uniquely Indian feature, will underpin the entirety of this thesis.

The second assumption behind Pant's reasoning can be explained through his personal belief that India's current foreign policy is untenable in the future. Stated simply, "India cannot continue with its multidimensional foreign policy for long without incurring significant costs."¹³ Pant creates a false binary for Indian strategic thinking when he claims that India's failure to choose between an alliance with Israel or Iran and whether to cooperate or hedge against rising China is evidence of an absence in foreign policy.¹⁴ Distaste for a policy, however, is not equal to an absence of policy. In

¹⁰ Pant, "A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy," pg 11

¹¹ Ibid pg 12-3

¹² Ibid pg 16

¹³ Ibid pg 12

¹⁴ Ibid pg 15

contrast, India's belief in its ability to maintain successful and independent multilateral alliances with various other states is arguably evidence of a strategic culture or doctrine howsoever ill-advised it may be.

Indeed, Mohan mobilizes similar examples of Indian foreign policy practice and rhetoric to highlight a robust and evolving strategic culture. Mohan points to the Indian behavior toward China as in fact "mimicking the U.S. in focusing on bilateral trade as a means to prolong any conflict with rising China."¹⁵ Even the burgeoning Indo-U.S. relationship is evidence of a shift in India's strategic calculations. Mohan highlights the domestic debate around the prudence of a warming U.S. relationship. He points out that the Congress Party risked political survival to enact a foreign policy that at the height of the Cold War was abhorrent. Congress's base was couched in the rhetoric (and actions) of non-alignment and anti-Western sentiment. In light of both the internal and external shifts of the new security environment Mohan believes there has been a shift in strategic objectives, which he calls a "shifting from the emphasis on autonomy to an emphasis on responsibility."¹⁶ To be sure, this evolution is still underway and not without deep ideological challenges. What began in Mohan's view after the nuclear tests as a growing self-confidence is now the first signs of evolving national security objectives.

This evolution is important for two reasons. Firstly, India like the United States has a "sense of a larger national destiny, an uncontrollable attraction to idealism...and

¹⁵ Mohan "Balancing Interests and Values" pg 148

¹⁶ Ibid pg 151-2

[is] therefore a difficult partner to engage.”¹⁷ India’s role in the international system is changing, whether or not it is rising boldly or clumsily may be better understood if India’s strategic vision is clarified. In large part, India’s strategic culture may shed much needed light on the continued debate about India’s rise and future relevance. Secondly, given that India’s strategic objectives may aid in an understanding of its intentions and presumably strategic behavior, the process of identifying clear strategic policy is paramount. Yet, India’s strategic culture is hard to determine. In part because western theorists are trapped within their own cultural prisms; they expect other states to project their intentions in the same way they would, calculate decisions the same way and carry out policy in their fashion. The reality is much more complex. The existing body of literature on strategic culture point out that a great deal of U.S. misunderstanding about the Soviet Union was because we were unable to operate outside of our cultural prism and thus evaluate the Soviet strategic culture. Therefore an analysis of India’s evolving national security objectives since May 1998 will have value added both to theoretical debates about India’s rise but also for U.S. policymakers who seek to better understand a burgeoning alliance.

The implication of this assumption will be addressed in detail in the following sections. The evidence employed from speeches, MEA and MOD reports and parliamentary debates, for example, underlay the subsequent rejection of Pant’s claim in favor of Mohan’s contrary argument that India does have clearly delineated strategic objectives.

¹⁷ Mohan “Balancing Interests and Values” pg 152

Indian Strategic Objectives: Three Concentric Circles

The foundation of my analysis is in line with the position articulated by Mohan that India does indeed have clear national security objectives but “Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Indian leaders do not announce new foreign policy doctrines.”¹⁸ In “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy Promotion” Mohan argues that since the May 1998 tests, India has undergone a significant change in strategic thinking and self-confidence as a rising power. India’s Nehruvian grand strategy has given way to a pragmatic and complex reevaluation of key strategic objectives. At first blush the “nuclearization of South Asia” would likely explain how India frames its national security considerations. This prism according to Mohan is far too simplistic a model to unpack New Delhi’s strategy. Rather Mohan posits that India’s “grand strategy” must be understood as three concentric circles.

The first circle is the immediate South Asian “neighborhood,” the second is the “extended neighborhood,” and finally, the global stage. Indian grand strategy is outlined in the latter spheres as extending its sphere of influence through economic and trade integration, soft power projection, balancing multiple growing alliances and an increasing role in shaping the international system. In contrast the first circle or the immediate neighborhood, is best described as a patchwork of various doctrines relating to military power, nuclear responsibility and tenuously managing relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This first circle embodies some of India’s greatest national

¹⁸ Mohan “India and the Balance of Power” pg 17

security concerns and challenges and in large part is viewed as the key element that is holding the country back from attaining its rightful place as a major power.

How Indian policies towards each of the three concentric circles have evolved will be the central focus of the MEA and MOD report analyses. If indeed, India's foreign policy objectives reflect an increasing desire to "rise responsibly" then this should be reflected, at least to some extent, in India's words and debates, if not actions. New Delhi's security priorities have shifted, I argue to reflect not only India's growing neighborhood influence but also a growing regional influence. However, with greater responsibilities and influence comes a greater need to project intentions and policies clearly and consistently. This has meant to some extent that New Delhi has had to make, and will likely continue to make challenging decisions about the national security priorities.

Therefore, in analyzing the changes and continuities in the annual reports I seek to shed light on what national security "tradeoffs" India may have to make in order to fulfill the objectives set out in the annual planning documents? The below analysis will seek principally to outline India's national security objectives and foreign policy considerations over the past decade in order to help elucidate how it may manage complex and potentially competing objectives in the future.

CHAPTER IV: MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DOCUMENT ANALYSES

In the following sections I will offer an introductory insight into the MEA and MOD reports and what may be gleaned from studying them. I then analyze the consistencies and changes in content of the MEA reports and the MOD reports from 1998–2010.

The Reports

The annual reports issued by the MEA and the MOD are an integral forum for the Parliament to ensure that the ministries are held accountable. The yearly report from the MEA serves to outline major themes of foreign policy in its introductory sections while the subsequent sections are summaries of each division's activities from the year previous. The MOD similarly reviews the 'current security environment'¹⁹ on regional, internal and global levels and then given this assessment, proceeds to outline future procurement needs in the remainder of the text. In effect, both annual reports are formalized "proof" that they were implementing the policies agreed upon or outlined.

Both the MEA and MOD reports are retrospective. They review the events from the past year and offer insights into the future challenges given the security environment they have outlined. The MEA is characteristically focused on the diplomatic efforts of India's foreign policy apparatus and the MOD is largely defense/military related. Both ministries' documents across the twelve years observed, however, addressed the current security environment and the stated foreign policy considerations and objectives of the

¹⁹ The MOD reports actually use the term 'current security environment' as a subsection of the annual report.

GoI. In comparing both sets of documents the uniformity of policy across both branches of government can be assessed. In order to best reflect the incremental changes in policy, I do not seek to impose a false delineation of time-periods—many of the changes that are noted below did not happen in the time span of one year, or even two, rather broad changes or alterations to themes or priorities in policy were detected over the decade. The following analysis is nuanced and often the changes noted are arguably intentionally obscured by the GoI, which, like most states seeks to portray a semblance of consistency or deliberateness in publications over time.

MEA: Foreign Policy Objectives

Not unlike most states, India's foreign policy is a laundry list of the greatest threats to its own national interest and the perceived policy solutions to those challenges. How the problems and solution sets have changed over the past decade are a reflection of both a changing global, regional and local security environment and India's perception of its own capabilities.

How then in the first years of the twenty-first century did India view its own security challenges and what were the prescribed solutions? Firstly, the MEA documents in the first half of the decade presented an itemized list of the key challenges and the principles behind the solutions to its national security. Beginning with the 1999–2000 annual MEA report, which reflects on the events of 1998–1999, major themes of Indian foreign policy are made clear. In the wake of major events like the Kargil incursion, the Asian financial crisis, and further consolidation of the Taliban's control in Afghanistan, India's stated primary concern was for its own domestic security

and prosperity. In the 2000–2001 annual report, the MEA states: “Certain essential priorities and objectives that inform India’s foreign policy can broadly be encapsulated as follows: To safeguard India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, enhance India’s strategic space and preserve the autonomy of our decision making process.”²⁰ How this goal is met is the subject of the subsequent 204 pages. In the case of the 2000–2001 report, the MEA describes the actions over the year and intentions going forward.

Secondly, the MEA establishes the theme of India playing a positive role in “Asia and in the world,” which arguably directly correlates to its preceding third goal: “To win international understanding and support for India’s national interest.” Despite the seemingly unremarkable nature of these priorities, these three key points are perhaps the most consistent concepts throughout the entire decade of MEA reports.

By the end of the 1990’s India’s economic liberalization had begun to transform both India’s standing in the world order and its own self-perceptions. Particularly, India sought to cultivate further economic growth through liberalization and integration of the economies in South and South East Asia. Perhaps most obviously captured in the “Look East” policy but also more subtly in the growing development of its “neighborhood” policy.

Throughout the 1999-2010 time period Indian foreign policy remained consistent in its belief that economic strength would lead to independence in decision making and eventually influence on the world stage. As India’s economy has grown and as it has, for the most part, effectively navigated the overwhelming foreign policy

²⁰ MEA 2000-01 pg i

challenges of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it seems unsurprising that the language employed in foreign policy documents has become increasingly confident and self-assertive. For example, in the 2000-01 MEA report the National Security Objectives section claims, “The size and positive trends of India’s economy give us the potential of playing a leading role in shaping the international economic order and pace of development.”²¹ However by the 2008-09 annual report India sees itself as a “responsible power” whose participation in the international effort to find solutions to “major international issues...will contribute to their success.”²² The following section looks at the MEA annual reports and addresses some, although not all, of the key themes of foreign policy in each of India’s three “circles.”

Neighbors, Neighborhoods and Interests

The use of “neighborhoods” to describe India’s foreign policy initiatives was used before the first decade of the twenty-first century. The evolution of India’s objectives in the neighborhoods during the decade, however, is telling. The annual report of 2010–2011 makes specific note of this terminology: “India has always regarded the concept of neighbourhood as one of widening concentric circles, around a central axis of historical and cultural commonalities.”²³ The neighborhoods broadly correspond to how both Mohan and Indian policy documents outline the concentric circles that dictate India’s interests.

²¹ MEA 2000-01 pg ii

²² MEA 2008-09 pg iii

²³ MEA 2010-2011 pg i

The first circle, which encompasses India's "immediate neighbors," also presents India's immediate concerns in the beginning half of the decade. The problem of security in the immediate neighborhood is solved according to the MEA by encouraging "mutually beneficial inter-dependence" so that India can "devote its resources and attention to developmental and infrastructural activities."²⁴ The concern of neighborhood security remains notably constant throughout the annual reports. The logic of a secure and prosperous immediate neighborhood affording India the opportunity to focus on "rapid domestic economic growth and social development"²⁵ is a fundamental equation in Indian foreign policy.

The extended neighborhood in contrast is less about India's immediate security concerns but more significantly about a reliance on mutually beneficial cooperation, particularly in the energy sphere and increasingly inclusive of defense cooperation.

Finally, the global arena has overlapping relevance for India's neighborhood construct. While transnational issues like multilateralism, terrorism, UN reform, nonproliferation and disarmament are consistent throughout the years, India's increasing sense of responsibility and capability in effectively addressing transnational issues is the most pertinent development in the MEA annual reports.

Economic Interdependence and the Immediate Neighborhood

Within the immediate neighborhood, India addressed concerns about the democratization of its neighbors, strengthening economic and cultural ties and ensuring

²⁴ MEA 2000-01 pg ii

²⁵ MEA 2001-2002 pg i

mutual respect. By 2004–2005, the MEA sought to underscore India’s unique economic success, particularly considering the insecurity of its immediate neighborhood. By posing the following question: “Countries across the globe are beginning to see India as an indispensable economic partner and seeking mutually rewarding economic and commercial links with its emerging economy. Should not India’s neighbors also seek to share in the prospects for mutual prosperity India offers to them?”²⁶, India portrays itself regularly in a benevolent context, but frustrated by the insecurity of its neighbors and their failure to see Indian policies as a model to emulate.

Although the MEA reports consistently highlight the potential for growth through mutual cooperation, by the middle of the decade under observation, India was beginning to show open dismay. India’s stated vision was of a multipolar world, in which developing countries would be given a voice and the chance to progress through economic integration. Ideally through organizations like Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), South-South policies for trade or South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) India would be the leading example claiming, “India is prepared to make its neighbors full stakeholders in India’s economic destiny.”²⁷ Despite a rapidly evolving “immediate neighborhood” the MEA documents have been consistent on insisting that economic integration was essential for the success of its (and the immediate neighbors’) success.

²⁶ MEA 2004-2005 pg i

²⁷ MEA 04-05 pg ii also see PM Vajpayee’s UN speech on multi-polarity

The Extended Neighborhood and Energy Security

India's foreign policy objectives for the extended neighborhood are primarily concerned with issues of regional integration on an economic level but increasingly this has focused on energy and resource security. Between 1999-2010 a few concerns have gained increasing prominence in the MEA annual reports. These include control over Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and naval modernization and resource security in light of India's rapidly growing economy. A major tenet of India's national security objectives is the belief that economic security is integral to national security. Economic security is best pursued through integrative means given the interconnectedness of the globalizing economy. In large part, during the time period observed, Indian policy documents have clearly reflected an underlying acknowledgement that India's economy can only continue to grow if it's equally expanded resource needs are met.²⁸

Growing resource demand has led to an expansion of the neighborhood philosophy to more actively consider the "extended neighborhood" broadly defined as East, South East, and Central Asia and the Middle East. The MEA annually reports growing bilateral trade figures, particularly with the ASEAN countries, figures were near \$2.5 billion in 1993–1994, \$5.36 billion in 1998–1999 and by 2009–2010 bilateral trade was reported at \$44 billion.²⁹ India has frequently cited 6–8 percent growth in gross domestic product in the MEA reports, calling particular attention to its resilience

²⁸ MEA 2007-08, "India's economic diplomacy has attached due importance to energy security that is vital for an assured high rate of growth for our economy." pg i

²⁹ MEA 1999-00 pg 15 and 10-11 pg vi

post the Asia financial crisis and the more recent global financial crisis: “Despite the global economic downturn resulting from the financial and economic crisis, India has fared better than most other countries, and remains one of the fastest growing among the major economies, with a growth rate that is expected to reach 7% plus in 2009-10.”³⁰

In order to maintain growth rates of this caliber, India has recognized that it must balance potentially hazardous bilateral relationships. While the MEA acknowledges that above and beyond the large Indian Diaspora in the Gulf States the Kingdom supplies around three-quarters of India’s crude oil imports.³¹ Although the relationship with the Gulf is described as based on “close historical ties and cultural affinities”³² the regions increasing significance is not solely based on civilizational bonds. This is also true for India’s overtures toward various Central Asian Region states (CARs), whose vast potentials for resource procurement have been a keen focus of Indian foreign policy objectives for the entirety of the decade. Although, many of India’s ambitions in the CARs have yet to come to fruition they have been an important axis of India’s extended neighborhood policy.³³

India has deftly maneuvered between a longstanding reliance on Saudi and United Arab Emirate crude with its growing defense relationship with Israel.³⁴ Equally as controversial and a central focus of later sections in this analysis, is India’s balancing

³⁰ MEA 2009-10 pg iii

³¹ MEA 2009-10 pg ix

³² MEA 1999-00 pg 35

³³ MEA 1999-00 pg 31

³⁴ See for example, Fair “Indo- Iranian Ties: Thicker than Oil” pg 52

act between its resource relationship with Iran and the growing connection to the United States.

Of equal concern, are India's efforts toward naval modernization to ensure the free flow of trade in the region. With an estimated 90 percent of India's resources imported via SLOC it is no wonder that a central locus of Indian foreign policy is in the security of the state's that supply its resources or about the transportation routes.

International Arena: terrorism, multilateralism, and pragmatism

The distinct change in India's self-perception about its role in the immediate and extended neighborhoods—from a member of a disenfranchised community, toward a shining exemplar of success against the international odds—was evident not just in the economic or energy spheres. Emphasis has been consistently placed on preventing “anti-Indian activity” and terrorism within the immediate neighborhood up to the international arena from 1998 onward. After 9/11, however, India sought to capitalize on the global attention that was finally being accorded this critical threat: “The terrorist attack of September 11 changed the manner in which the world viewed the phenomenon of terrorism...There is now widespread awareness in the international community that the phenomenon of terrorism must be tackled globally, and in a non-selective manner, for which close international cooperation is a basic requirement.”³⁵

Terrorism originating out of Afghanistan (under the Taliban) and Pakistan (as the Taliban's close ally) was a central and overarching concern for Indian foreign policy. Over time, India has adopted a more muted verbiage when describing this threat.

³⁵ MEA 2001-02 pg i

For example, in the 1999 report when describing the Kargil Crisis the MEA stated “The international community also concurred with our assertion that Kargil was a manifestation of the medieval malevolence spilling over from Afghanistan...”³⁶ In addition, after the December 13 Parliament bombings the MEA reports the attack as “audacious” but even more telling was the justification for Pakistan’s sponsorship of the attack: “that Pakistan- a product of the indefensible Two Nation Theory, a theocratic state with an extremely tenuous traditions [sic] of democracy- is unable to reconcile itself with the reality of a secular, democratic, self confident and steadily progressing India, whose standing in the international community is getting inexorably higher with the passage of time.”³⁷ This description is an unabashedly honest window into India’s deep seated distaste for its neighbor and the firm belief in Indian moral superiority. The statement, like others in regard to Pakistan, is highly emotionally-driven, particularly for a formal foreign policy document.

The previous description must therefore be compared to the description of terrorism post-Mumbai: “Pakistan’s inability to implement her commitments as evidenced by the terrorist attacks from Pakistan on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and on Mumbai in November 2008 effectively suspended the dialogue process. The Mumbai attacks were universally condemned by the international community.”³⁸

³⁶ MEA 1999-01 pg 3 Also the MOD annual report of 2002-03 describes Pakistan in these terms, “...the single greatest threat to peace and stability in the region is posed by the combination of terrorism nurtured in and by Pakistan for its strategic objectives, and the ingrained adventurism of the Pakistani military motivated by its obsessive and compulsive hostility towards India.” Pg 3

³⁷ MEA 2001-02 pg 9

³⁸ MEA 2008-09 pg ii

The reports have arguably begun to depict a more mature, less “shrill”³⁹ approach toward relations with its most pressing perceived threat. Indian documents seem to have registered that the single most critical challenge to its ascent is its visceral and hazardous relationship with Pakistan. By demonstrably restraining the inflammatory impulses of its foreign policy language, India seems to be reflecting an actual shift in policy toward Pakistan. While causally there is at best a tenuous link, the mild language in the reports has corresponded over the years with a warming of relations, the resumption of high level talks and confidence-building measures.⁴⁰

Over the decade India continuously asserted that relations with Pakistan over Kashmir must remain a bilateral issue even though there was an increasing bifurcation between the Kashmir issue and terrorism.⁴¹ Where once the two issues were largely interrelated, today the documents reflect India’s desire to have international recognition for the challenges of terrorism emanating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but separate out the settlement over the disputed Kashmiri territory.

This is one example (of many) that points to a duality and seeming contradiction in Indian foreign policy. India seeks both bilateral and multilateral fora to address overlapping issues. Just as India has signed a series of bilateral civil nuclear agreements with the United States, France, and Russia, New Delhi continues to pursue disarmament

³⁹ Subrata K. Mitra, *Politics in India*, “On the Indian side, in the place of the shrill ideological rhetoric of the past, one now finds a more moderate, pragmatic and nuanced approach to the United States, as well as to Pakistan.” pg 180

⁴⁰ This change is mostly likely the result of both the nature of domestic politics, constraints on India’s foreign policy behavior as a result of other foreign policy relationships-like that with the U.S. and a genuine recognition that if India wants to be considered a responsible power it must ‘act and speak’ like one.

⁴¹ See MEA 1999-01 pg 4

and nonproliferation policies in the UN. Yet these policies directly reflect another one of India's central foreign policy tenets: pragmatism and flexibility. The subsequent years' annual reports show a marked increase in the prevalence and prominence of transnational issues, particularly terrorism and "India's capability to shoulder regional and global responsibilities, and the consequent change in global expectations of India's role on the international stage."⁴² In large part, India points to its exceptional pragmatism and flexibility for its deft maneuvering of these complex objectives.

India, consistently throughout the reports, relies on phrases like "the international community agrees with India" in order to lend credence to Indian policies and assertions. A central tenet to Indian foreign policy objectives is to retain sovereignty in decision making. India both wants the international recognition of the challenges it faces and its achievements in addressing them, while simultaneously seeking to maintain autonomy. Further confusion arises with India's dogged pursuit to prove that it is entitled to re-ordering the international community to better reflect reality: the rise of new powers, to include India.

Traditional and continuous focus on international organizations, institutions and causes has been a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy objectives. Whether through the nonproliferation and disarmament regimes, such as NAM and SAARC or through UN reform in general, India has sought to lead the developing nations into a position of power through unity.⁴³ This has not been an easy path for Indian policymakers in recent

⁴² MEA 2005-06 pg i

⁴³ MEA 2006-07 pg i

years, particularly as India's foreign policy is first and foremost about protecting India's interests.⁴⁴ Consistently the MEA reports claim that India's own self-interest is best served through a safe and prosperous external environment.

The MEA reports indicate that security and prosperity is best achieved through multilateral organizations and cooperative efforts.⁴⁵ India's role in the international arena, however, has changed. In 2001-02 India sought "high-level consultations" with major powers to ensure "that our views found echo in the councils of the world,"⁴⁶ by 2003, "the main thrust of India's foreign policy has been to establish its rightful place in the emerging world order."⁴⁷ Equally, India sought non-permanent member status in the UN Security Council in 2006 but by 2007 was seeking permanent member status, culminating in the MEA's most recent and proud announcement of President Barak Obama's endorsement of the Indian bid for permanent member status in 2010.⁴⁸

In the above example, multilateralism was a way for India to have a voice in the international system. Where in the past India relied on "power in numbers" through economic, trade, diplomacy and policy institutions, increasingly the MEA reports reflect not only India's ability to stand independently, but also the desire to lead. In touting its 2011–2012 election as a non-permanent UNSC member, the annual report

⁴⁴ Nearly every MEA report begins with India's self-interest in ensuring a mutually beneficial security environment. For example "India's foreign policy seeks to safeguard the country's enlightened self-interest. The primary objective of India's foreign policy is to promote and maintain a peaceful and stable external environment" (MEA 2008-09 pg i)

⁴⁵ MEA 2005-06 "India has advocated the need to evolve a new paradigm of cooperation...and multilateralism becomes the only effective tool for addressing global challenges." Pg i

⁴⁶ MEA 2001-02 pg i

⁴⁷ MEA 2003 pg i

⁴⁸ MEA 2010-11 pg 88

claims the vote “...signaled an important endorsement by the international community of India’s credentials in the global arena” and “would enhance its [the UN’s] effectiveness and legitimacy.”⁴⁹ India’s self-perception has undergone an important change which has been subtly reflected in its foreign policy; namely, that India’s participation now lends institutions authority.

How then does India reconcile some of its long held principles (Pansheel⁵⁰, nonproliferation, disarmament, etc.) with its burgeoning role in international affairs? India’s challenge of balancing its nuclear weapons capability with its disarmament policy is instructive. As a nuclear weapons state India has actively attempted to portray this characteristic as both natural to its stated foreign policy objectives and inherently non-contradictory to its long held Nehruvian doctrine. This policy is exemplified by India’s principled stand against signing the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is considered discriminatory, while simultaneously upholding a belief in non-proliferation.

India’s primary foreign policy objective is inherently self-interested. However, India believes that peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit are preconditions for India to meet its core national security objectives of economic growth and the betterment of its citizens. The path toward this goal is not a proscriptive policy (which may be evident in other states’ foreign policy documents) rather, “foreign policy must be flexible

⁴⁹ MEA 2010-11

⁵⁰ Pansheel is a Nehru era doctrine that was developed between India and China the five principles are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. For an introduction into the duality in doctrine and actions as regards Pansheel see Mohan “How to intervene” *The Indian Express*, March 07, 2011 <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/how-to-intervene/758818/3>

enough to optimally respond to new challenges and opportunities.”⁵¹ India’s foreign policy is intrinsically related to “building the nation’s capabilities through economic development, strengthening social well-being and protecting India’s sovereignty.”⁵² In order to conduct effective international relations, India is aware that it must simultaneously protect its domestic interests.

Through “pragmatism and pursuit of national interests”⁵³ and “manifest ability to adjust to change”⁵⁴ “Indian foreign policy has combined firm commitment to our core national values with dynamic adaptation.”⁵⁵ Built into all of the MEA reports is the freedom to readjust policies to meet whatever the pressing national interests are at the time. Although India seeks non-interference and maintenance of sovereignty, it interfered with Bangladesh in 1971, and has repeatedly been involved in Sri Lanka’s insurgency because these were considered integral issues to India’s national security.⁵⁶

Despite years of attempting to lead a movement toward disarmament, India has pursued not only peaceful use of nuclear technology but weapons as well.⁵⁷ While questioning the intentions of China’s military modernization and rise, India has offered platitudes for the modernization of its own forces and reassurances that its rise will be peaceful.⁵⁸ India has pursued a policy that follows similar practices to other democracies, in that it must balance the domestic whims of the voting polity with the

⁵¹ MEA 2003-04 pg i

⁵² ibid

⁵³ ibid

⁵⁴ MEA 2005-06 pg i

⁵⁵ MEA 2009-10 pg i

⁵⁶ See Mohan “How to intervene”

⁵⁷ Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, *CRS* October 28, 2010

⁵⁸ MOD 2008-09 pg 6

foreign policy of a state hoping to increasingly project power to protect its national interests. This duality is not often satisfactorily reconciled for the careful observer as, attempts to balance both sets of demands are self-evident in the language of the annual reports.

MOD: National Security Environment

The MOD annual reports offer some clarity to Indian foreign policy objectives in that each report begins by outlining the “national security environment” and the “national security objectives.” On a macro level, the MOD reports have undergone changes in organizational structure that reflect some of the shifts in Indian foreign policy addressed above. Primarily the alteration in India’s self-perception as an emerging power is encapsulated by the sub-titles articulated in the MOD reports over time.

In the beginning of the decade the National Security Environment portion of the annual reports looked at “National Security Objectives,” “Salient Features of National Security Environment,” “Our Neighbors,” “India’s Nuclear Policy, Disarmament and International Security,” “Energy Security,” and “Impact of Technology.” Each of these sections corresponded with little divergence to the priorities outlined in the MEA reports. In contrast, the MOD report from 2009–2010 lists, “Geo Strategic Imperatives,” “The Global Security Environment,” “The Regional Security Environment,” and “Internal Security Challenges.” Although this alteration is only one symbol of India’s foreign policy changes, it does serve to highlight that there have been changes. A closer

look at the broad themes within the text further underscores the contextual significance of the new sub-titles.

The MOD annual reports' definitions of the "National Security Environment" are the most instructive sections for understanding India's foreign policy as concentric circles. By observing how the priority of these circles have in some instances changed, but in others remained the same, the analysis of Indian foreign policy objectives is further demonstrated.

In the 1999–2000 MOD annual report the first issue for India was the intrusion of Pakistani forces in Kargil. Echoing the sentiments of the MEA report, the intrusion was described as "desperate" and a "betrayal of trust" while the MOD report points to a number of equipment and logistical "shortcomings" but that Indian security forces "remained vigilant" and that "the militancy was effectively checked."⁵⁹ The second issue India was concerned with was the modernization of China's forces and their cooperation with Pakistan. While simultaneously concerned with the "militarization of fundamentalist forces" in the region, the report stresses India's policy of "peaceful co-existence."

This duality leads the MOD to claim that "the international and regional security environment warrants that we remain fully prepared to protect our legitimate security interests."⁶⁰ India portrays itself largely as a peace-loving and cooperative state that is forced into a defensive posture as a result of external aggression. The 2004–2005 MOD

⁵⁹ MOD 1999-2000 pg 2

⁶⁰ MOD 1999-2000 pg 3

report captures this sentiment in describing India's nuclear tests: "Faced with an untenable nuclear environment, India was forced to resort to the nuclear option in 1998. As a nuclear state, India is even more conscious of its responsibility in regard to nuclear safety, nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament."⁶¹ Yet throughout the decade India has pursued foreign and military policies that would not be difficult to label as threatening to its neighbors.⁶² At least in rhetoric, these policies are couched in terms of defensive reactions.

Given the above portrait of a dangerous security environment the MOD reports are consistent in their attempts to portray India's military doctrine as subservient to the foreign policy practices of peaceful co-existence. The "National Security Objectives" outlined by the annual reports have changed subtly over time.⁶³ They have remained consistent in efforts to balance growing capabilities with clear signals of peaceful intentions.⁶⁴

Much like the MEA reports, the MOD also believes that national security priorities are only met by ensuring a peaceful external environment.⁶⁵ The MOD reports take pains to depict its security as inextricably linked with the prosperity and safety of

⁶¹ MOD 2004-05 pg 14

⁶² Consider naval modernization in order to better control its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), the Chabahar port with Iran in order to bypass transporting goods and resources through Pakistan, the nuclear weapons tests of 1998, increased defense cooperation with Japan and other SE Asian states (as a counter, albeit weak one, to China's military), pursuit of energy resources in the CAS etc.

⁶³ Consider the diminution in the prevalence of WMD proliferation as a major security concern, in the beginning of the decade this was a central concept that was afforded its own section; by the end of the decade it was only mentioned in 2 bullet points of 31.

⁶⁴ For example, the 2005-06 report says "India remains fully committed to the twin policies of (a) no territorial ambition, and (b) no export of ideology." pg 12

⁶⁵ For example, the MOD 2006-07 annual report claims "India's commitment to global, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament, which would enhance its security and that of all states, remains unaltered." pg 10

its neighbors, “For its further growth and prosperity, India needs a secure and peaceful periphery. Working in that direction, India has striven to give its neighbours stakes in its own growth, through trade, investment and services.” Yet, “At the same time, India continues to take all measures for the security and safety of all its citizens.”⁶⁶

Essentially, India is signaling that while hoping for mutual peace and prosperity, “the country and our defence forces remain prepared to tackle the full spectrum of security challenges”⁶⁷

What do these seemingly contradictory objectives mean for Indian foreign policy priorities and practices? To a large extent Indian MOD documents appear to be echoing the bravado of the MEA reports. It is largely unsurprising that the two major arms of foreign policy planning and implementation (the MEA and MOD) would undergo similar growth in confident rhetoric. The 2003–2004 annual report claims that “The nature of new threats also reinforced the need for international cooperation to combat terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and underline the role that India could play in the global response against such forces.”⁶⁸ India sees its potential as an emerging partner of the international community to combat transnational threats with local dimensions. In the 2005–2006 annual report the MOD describes the national security environment as “multipolar” with India’s transformation into one of those poles as “slow but steady.”⁶⁹ By the following year India saw its strategic role in the region as increasing, with 66 percent of the world’s energy being transported “in

⁶⁶ MOD 2008-09 pg 4

⁶⁷ MOD 2009-10 pg 9

⁶⁸ MOD 2003-04 pg 6

⁶⁹ MOD 2005-06 pg 2

close proximity to India, thereby placing a prime responsibility towards safety of this key energy flow. This can only be achieved by having visible and potent defense forces.”⁷⁰ Tellingly, the 2009–2010 report cites that “India stands as a bulwark against fundamentalism and extremism. It is a centre of economic dynamism in the region and as a plural democracy, a bastion of stability and peaceful coexistence.”⁷¹ India’s self-perception has clearly begun to indicate that it seeks major power responsibilities and status. If not yet in practice, this is certainly true in rhetoric.

⁷⁰ MOD 2006-07 pg 3

⁷¹ MOD 2009-10 pg 3

CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS

The primary purpose of the MEA and MOD document analyses was to first achieve a better understanding of how India's foreign policy language has evolved over the past decade. I hypothesized that these documents are, to a great extent, indicative of the GoI's national security objectives and how their national security environment is understood. I sought to offer clarity on the applicability of Raja Mohan's argument that India's foreign policy considerations were best understood through the prism of three spheres of influence. The above analysis of the annual reports has made clear that there has been an evolution in how India defines its national security concerns but that they continue to adhere to Mohan's description.

Given this assessment, how then will India's current and future security objectives manifest in foreign policy decision making? If India continues to pursue a compartmentalized policy, whereby the objectives in each security circle are weighed based on pragmatic merit, will India be forced to make strategic trade-offs in its relations with other states, as Paul Kapur claims? Or alternatively, has an analysis of Indian foreign policy planning documents bolstered Raja Mohan's argument that India can continue to deftly balance seemingly contradictory relationships, at least for the near-future?

The following section will begin by addressing India's current foreign policy concerns, I then engage in a discussion of the potential tradeoffs that India will face if it continues to pursue the foreign policy objectives as outlined in the annual reports

analyzed above. Finally I will seek to make some broad hypotheses about the future of Indian foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Concerns and Tradeoffs

In the beginning of the decade Indian foreign policy planning documents were first and foremost concerned with developing security and economic interdependence in its closest neighborhood. These goals were to be pursued, as spelt out in the annual reports, through active participation and leadership in international and regional organizations. Emphasis on the Non Aligned Movement, the UN, ASEAN and SAARC were given significant attention both in the introductory sections of the MEA reports but were also expanded upon in great depth throughout the sub-sections of the documents.

Throughout the decade there has been an erosion of the multilateralism that once epitomized India's foreign policy. The annual reports called attention to India's participation and leadership in cooperative organizations yet increasing amounts of pages were occupied by India's primary and unilateral security threat: terrorism emanating out of Pakistan. The annual reports indicated a sense that India felt as though its fight against terrorism was unappreciated by the international community and therefore, it was India's burden to bear, even if it was alone.

Faced with the demise of its primary ally the Soviet Union,⁷² India's foreign policy concerns underwent a natural and necessary shift. During the 1990s India's focus on multilateralism and economic cooperation as the forefront of its rise slowly gave way to a focus on countering terrorism in order to securitize the region. Economic growth

⁷² Although India argued that they were not bounded by their 'mutual cooperation'

remained paramount; however now as a means to an end, not an end in itself. New Delhi began to adopt the belief that it could no longer count on economic strength alone to cement its rise, but instead with power came the responsibility to protect itself against ever more complex threats.

Two crises at the beginning of the decade serve to clarify the shifts in the language of the annual reports. The first was the Kargil crisis in 1999 followed shortly thereafter by the 2001 Parliament attack. At the turn of the twenty-first century, not only did India fear a conventional Sino-Pakistan encirclement, but the nuclearization of South Asia added a new level of uncertainty and insecurity in India's immediate neighborhood. The consequences of the nuclear tests, in addition to the heightened tensions between India and Pakistan were the supreme national security concern as evidenced in the MEA and MOD reports in the beginning half of the decade.

As a result of the conflicting states' nuclear parity, Pakistan began to adopt a more aggressive military and militant-proxy policy under the assumption that India's foreign policy was newly constrained. Demonstrably, the Pakistani military had developed a plan to infiltrate Kashmir using military personnel and Kashmiri militants (who knew the terrain), in order to shift the Line of Control and thereby, alter the status quo of the conflict with India. Under the direction of General (and later President) Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani forces infiltrated Indian held Kashmir prompting the Kargil War. The involvement of Pakistan's conventional forces in the infiltration triggered a

massive conventional military buildup along the line of control, bringing India and Pakistan to the brink of a nuclear exchange.⁷³

Pakistani leadership,⁷⁴ in light of the nuclear tests, believed that India would not allow any crisis to deteriorate into a conventional war thereby increasing the chance of a nuclear exchange. To their chagrin, neither the BJP government, led by PM Vajpayee, nor the Indian polity, was willing to tolerate such a brazen act of war without some response. The Kargil War thus, served as an essential lesson to future Pakistani governments, namely, anything but proxy-war, which afforded a high degree of ‘plausible deniability’ for Islamabad, could be used against India. India on the other hand learned a very different lesson from Kargil; although Pakistani aggression was obvious, the international community was now more interested in preventing a nuclear exchange than punishing an ‘aggressor’.

Pakistan’s freedom to rely on a covert proxy-war increased the value of domestic militant groups who, if willing to take direction from the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments, would be considered to be at the forefront of the conflict with India. For India, these militants were also at the forefront of their national security policies and epitomized India’s foreign policy concerns.

⁷³ It remains contested how close the two countries came to an exchange, or how high tensions were running, suffice it to say however, that most analysts agree that without U.S. intervention in the crisis, the situation would have deteriorated rapidly.

⁷⁴ Again, President Sharif at the time claimed he was unaware of his military’s involvement, although many analysts are skeptical of this denial.

This policy shift was further exemplified by the 2001 attack on India's Parliament. On December 13, five LeT/JeM militants⁷⁵ entered the Parliament building only moments after the assembly had departed. The attack caused outrage in India and alarm for the international community. For the second time in as many years India and Pakistan were at the brink of war. The repercussions of India's conventional mobilization and Pakistan's reciprocal mobilization again heightened the risk of a nuclear exchange. The reorientation of Pakistani forces from the western to eastern border adversely affected the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and again prompted active mediation. Again India was forced to recognize that U.S. interest in the region was not solely the evidence of a warming Indo-U.S. rapport, but rather signaled that stability in South Asia was paramount for U.S. interests.

The lesson for Pakistan in the post-9/11 world therefore was twofold; firstly, the U.S. now had vital stakes in preventing a heightening of the Indo-Pak conflict. The U.S.'s reliance on Pakistan as a partner in the war on terror meant that their mediation in any conflict was a given. Secondly, it became clear that the use of militants to wage a proxy war was inflammatory for New Delhi, but due to U.S. mediation, an effective policy. These lessons were surely not lost on India, who at the same time began to capitalize on the international attention to terrorism in order to highlight the insecurity of Pakistan.

⁷⁵ LeT's involvement is contested in this attack, the group has denied any involvement and when four men were caught they were all said to be a part of JeM. However, it is important to note that often these groups have overlapping membership. While the plans may not have come from LeT leadership they would have surely supported the cause and plausibly allowed their members to be involved.

While the MEA and MOD reports began emphasizing India's leadership role in fighting extremism and insecurity in the region, relations with another sponsor of terrorism were warming. The Indo-Iranian relationship throughout the 1999-2010 reports seemed to contradict India's increasing focus on countering extremism in its neighborhoods. The Indo-Iranian relationship, which is indicative of both India's interests in its extended neighborhood and the challenges it faces therein, appears to serve two critical functions for Indian foreign policy objectives. In the first instance, Iran and India share concerns for energy and resource security.⁷⁶ On another level, India's expanding interests in Iran are correlated to increasing India's strategic options in the larger Asian region. Iran serves as a counter-weight to Pakistan, affording India strategic depth particularly in Afghanistan.⁷⁷

Growing ties between India and Iran may at first seem inconsequential; a stalled LNG pipeline, growing but still diminutive trade relationship⁷⁸ and limited defense exchanges⁷⁹, yet what their relationship lacks in tangible outcomes it makes up for in strategic importance. Over the decade both the MEA and the MOD reports maintained a consistent description of India's relationship with Iran. Described as "cordial and multi-

⁷⁶ K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman CRS "India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests", August 2, 2006, "There are signs that, in the wake of the July 2005 launch of a U.S.-India "global partnership" and plans for bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, India is bringing its Iran policy into closer alignment with that of the United States." pg 2

⁷⁷ Both India and Iran have sought to counter the Taliban and diminish Pakistan's influence over Afghanistan.

⁷⁸ Indian Iran trade relations were reported in the 10-11 MEA report as just over \$13 billion, in comparison to \$69.9 billion in US-Indian trade in 2008 reported in the MEA 1999-10 document

⁷⁹ For a detailed listing of Indo-Iranian defense cooperation see C. Christine Fair "Indo-Iranian ties: thicker than oil" pg 49-50

faceted”⁸⁰ with “congruent views on a range of regional and international issues”⁸¹, Indo-Iranian ties have been termed increasingly over the years, as a strategic relationship. Both India and Iran would benefit from increased bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, particularly to meet India’s growing resource needs and to meet Iran’s current inability to produce the LNG.⁸² India and Iran have similar energy stakes in the CASs which offer the potential for resource extraction but also offer a prospective trade route to Russia. Perhaps more tacitly, India and Iran share similar goals in their pursuit of greater regional power, and the reordering of the international system to make room for their perceived growing influence and security concerns. The Indo-Iranian relationship however, epitomizes one potential tradeoff in the future.

Although India has managed to use its tenuous security situation in the immediate neighborhood to bolster its credibility and image of responsibility, the extended neighbor may pose a much greater challenge for India’s future foreign policies. Iran serves as the most salient example given the dramatic increase of international, specifically U.S., criticism for Iran’s nuclear policies. This presents an important consideration for India, which espouses both a belief in non-discriminatory nuclear cooperation and disarmament. Most relevant for Indian policy in the future is that over the past decade it has become increasingly difficult to compartmentalize its extended neighborhood policies and its international policies. The growing Indo-U.S.

⁸⁰ MEA 2000-01 pg iv

⁸¹ MEA 2003-04 pg 22

⁸² See for examples, C. Christine Fair “Indo-Iranian ties: thicker than oil” pg 47-48 and MEA 2000-01 pg iv

relationship juxtaposed to the Indo-Iranian relationship has presented one interesting example of India's pragmatic alliance balancing. India's future ability to continue these contradictory policies may not only be inadvisable, but perhaps impossible.

India's deference to Iran despite growing international proscription was expressed in the MEA and MOD reports by its notable absence. As tensions over Iran's nuclear program began to rise in the middle of the decade Indian strategic documents gave very little indication that these significant events were even underway. The 2003-2004 MEA report uses a text box to call attention to the fact that, "The Iranian side also briefed the Indian side on the peace approaches of its nuclear programme."⁸³ But in the 2004-2005 MOD report a subtle shift in Indian rhetoric can be noted, "Strains over Iran's nuclear intentions and the reactions of the international community to it, could have a destabilizing impact on the region."⁸⁴

Similarly in the MEA report Iran quietly shifted from the immediate neighborhood section into the extended neighborhood.⁸⁵ India was unwilling to openly criticize Iran's tenuous 'peaceful' program, but regularly insisted that Iran, under the provisions of the NPT, was entitled to civil nuclear technologies. This was further reiterated in PM Singh's speech to Indian Parliament in 2007, "India while upholding Iran's sovereign right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, called upon Iran to cooperate with the IAEA in honouring safeguards which it had undertaken as a

⁸³ MEA 2003-04 pg 27

⁸⁴ MOD 2004-05 pg 8

⁸⁵ MEA 2004-05 pg 47

signatory to the NPT...”⁸⁶ Indian objectives were threefold; firstly, to reinforce its long standing belief in the sovereign rights of states to pursue their national interests.

Secondly, India sought to balance its growing ties with the U.S. vis- a- vis the civil nuclear deal. Finally, India has to maintain its commitment, at least in rhetoric, to non-proliferation. In so doing, India was attempting to disentangle and thereby justify the competing and contradictory nuclear policies that it has espoused. India was signaling that not all nuclear technologies are the same; differentiation between peaceful nuclear programs and weapons technologies is possible.⁸⁷

Yet, India’s support for Iran did in fact cause some challenges for the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal.⁸⁸ Firstly, Congress members in the U.S. did express some reticence to trust India given its relationship with Iran, “In January 2006, the U.S. Ambassador to India explicitly linked progress on proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation with India’s upcoming vote, saying if India chose not to side with the United States, he believed the U.S.-India initiative would fail in the Congress.”⁸⁹ This attempt by Washington to constrain Indian behavior was met with opprobrium in India’s Parliament. Aside from a string of serious debates which expressed heated opposition to the deal, Indian policymakers were still voicing their policy of autonomy in decision making in 2010. For example, the External Affairs Minister (EAM) was asked by one

⁸⁶ MEA Foreign Relations Report 2006 pg 22-23

⁸⁷ MOD 2006-07, “India has made clear that it does not support the emergence of new nuclear weapon states” pg 10 and see MOD 09-10 “Iran has underlined the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. India and Iran share historical and cultural ties and India continued to support a peaceful resolution of the issue which would be in the interest of peace and stability in West Asia.” pg 4

⁸⁸ For a good review of these challenges see Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress” *CRS* October 28, 2010

⁸⁹ Krongstad, “India-Iran Relations” pg 3

Parliamentarian “whether the US President during his recent visit, made some remarks about India’s relations with Iran...whether the Government [of India] proposes to change its foreign policy in regard to...US President’s remarks?” His response, “Iran is a major source of India’s imports of energy resources...India’s bilateral relations...stand on their own and are not influence by India’s relations with third countries.”⁹⁰

Even after voting with the U.S. for adopting UNSC resolution 1929 which placed further sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, the EAM assured Parliament “Government remains committed to maintaining and further strengthening bilateral relations with Iran, including economic and trade ties and in the energy sector. There have been regular high-level exchanges including consultations at ministerial level between India and Iran to discuss bilateral relations and important regional and global issues.”⁹¹

In voting affirmatively for the sanctions against Iran, Indian policy may at first glance seem as though it were being dictated by the whims of Washington. However, in light of India’s pragmatic national security policies, it would be more accurate to put the vote in the context of greater considerations. India’s slow rise has led to the challenging feat of balancing a historical legacy of peaceful, multilateral, non-aligned doctrines with its emergence. In order to meet the security interests of its expanding influence India has sought to appear consistent and true to the time honored doctrines both to appease

⁹⁰ See MEA Q.3552 “Shift in policy on Iran and Myanmar”, December 01, 2010

⁹¹ MEA STARRED QUESTION NO.248, August 11, 2010

the overwhelming domestic support for these policies, but also to assure all those who may be fearful of its rise, that its intentions are benign.

This is no easy task and will likely not be any easier in the future. India, like any democracy, must continually address the concerns of its voting masses, the elite constituencies who form policy and make strategic decisions, while also balancing the same security priorities of any large nation in a complex global security environment. The MEA and MOD annual reports do offer some needed insight into how India has managed to address these challenges. In a time period in India's history where the only real consistency is change, the annual reports depict India's admirable struggle to come to grips with balancing an intrinsic belief in peaceful co-existence with a desire to increasingly project power. PM Singh captured the nature of Indian foreign policy best when in a speech to Parliament he explained,

“...interaction among sovereign countries is essentially a matching of sovereign but competing interests. It involves living with contradictions. No written document of any nature can spell out everything on earth in black and white. There are grey areas which are left vague and unexplained. Reconciling those calls for ingenuity of the highest order. It is the outcome of this interaction that constitutes international relations called diplomacy. Great nations have diverse interests and contradictory challenges to meet. There cannot be a strait jacket or a single approach to them.”⁹²

No state is expected to successfully navigate all its unique foreign policy challenges. Indian foreign policy will certainly continue to confound and generate debate; however it would appear that the foreign policy documents do lend clarity to India's current objectives but also the challenges likely faced in the future.

⁹² MEA, Foreign Relations Report, 2007 pg 16

Conclusions

The above exposition highlighted some of India's major national security concerns over the past decade, but also some of the challenges faced in negotiating conflicting priorities. India's future foreign policy challenges will likely raise some equally complex questions for prioritization of objectives. India's immediate neighborhood has remained a fairly constant balance between pursuing integrating economic policies and a defensive security posture. The extended and international spheres have begun to require an increasingly complex calculus which has left many scholars like Harsh Pant to argue that India has hitherto not managed to successfully balance its foreign policy objectives. I have argued in line with Raja Mohan that India's foreign policy is beginning to take clearer shape and that India's success at balancing competing priorities while still a contentious issue, is in fact possible.

The MEA and MOD annual reports indicate that India's rising influence in the Asian region is appreciated by New Delhi, which is beginning to not only project a sense of security, power, and benign intentions but also continuity. New Delhi's foreign policy planning documents consistently address the importance of sending non-threatening signals to its neighbors and the international community. Policymakers in New Delhi seem to also believe that their rising status as a 'responsible power' should afford them greater international influence.⁹³ Should New Delhi continue to pursue a positive role in stabilizing the immediate and extended neighborhoods, then India may yet prove to be a responsible rising power in the global arena.

⁹³ See for example MOD 2005-06 pg 4

APPENDIX A: MAP OF ASIA



Source: University of Texas, Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/asia_ref_2010.pdf

APPENDIX B: IMMEDIATE AND EXTENDED NEIGHBORHOODS



Source: University of Texas, Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/asia_ref802643_99.jpg, altered by author.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jeffery Beener, *The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy*, (Colorado: Westview Replica press, 1985)

Donald Berlin, “India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente” *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, October, 2004

Peter J. Brown “India sends mixed signals on Iran”, *Asia Times Online*, July 2, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG02Df01.html

Monika Chansoria, “India-Iran Defense Cooperation”, *India Defense Review*, vol 25.1, Jan-March 2010, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/India-Iran-Defence-Cooperation-.html>

Stephen Cohen ‘India Rising’, *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000)

Xenia Dormandy, “India-Iran Relations: Key Security Implications”, *Belfer Center*, March 24, 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18176/indiairan_relations.html?breadcru mb=%2F

C. Christine Fair, “India in Afghanistan and Beyond” *Century Foundation Report*, 2010; and “Indo-Iranian ties: thicker than oil” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007)

Sumit Ganguly, *India as an Emerging Power* (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

Raja Karthikeya, “India’s Iran Calculus” *Foreign Policy*, September 24, 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/24/indias_iran_calculus

Kapur, ‘India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe’ *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 2, Fall 2005 and *Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia* (MIT, 2008)

K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests, August 2, 2006 and Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, *CRS*, October 28, 2010

Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08)

Howard LaFranchi, “Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India?”, *CSM*, July 18, 2009 <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2009/0718/p25s05-usfp.html>

Subrata K. Mitra, *Politics in India: Structure, process and policy*, (New York: Routledge, 2011)

C. Raja Mohan, ‘India and the Balance of Power’, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 85 no. 4 (July/Aug 2006); and “Poised for Power: The Domestic Roots of India’s Slow Rise,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills Ed. *Strategic Asia 2007-2008* (Seattle: NBR, 2007); and, “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy Promotion”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 3, (Summer,2007); and “India’s Quest for Continuity in the Face of Change”, *The Washington Quarterly* Vol.31 No. 4 (Autumn, 2008); and “How to Intervene” *India Express*, March 07, 2011,

Jeevan Nair and U.C. Jain, *The Indian Bureaucratic System*, (Jaipur, India: Pointer Publishers, 2000)

Harsh V. Pant, “Indian Foreign Policy Challenges: Substantive Uncertainties and Institutional Infirmities”, *Asian Affairs*, (vol. XL, no. I, March 2009); and “A Fine Balance: India Walks a Tightrope between Iran and the United States” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Summer 2007; and “India’s Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing” Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly*, 34:1 pp. 61- 74, 2011; and *Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates its Rise in the International System*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillin, 2008)

Rigzin Samphel “India's civil service: Battling the babu raj” *The Economist*, March 6, 2008

David Scott, “India's “Extended Neighborhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power,” *India Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 107-143, (2009)

Ashley Tellis, et al. eds, *Asia’s Rising Power*, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2010)

Ramesh Thakur, ‘India in the World: Neither Rich, Powerful nor Principled’ *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1997)

Nidhi Verma, “India buys more Iran, less Saudi Crude oil in 08/09”, *Reuters*, May 7, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/07/india-crude-imports-idUKSP39539720090507>

Stanley A. Weiss, “Realignment: India + Iran = a foundation for stability”,
International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2003

Robert G. Wirsing, “In India's Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2007

Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defense:

“Speech by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee at a Symposium on the Role of India in the New World Order” December 14, 2001,
<http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=53015683>

“Inaugural Address by National Security Adviser, Shri Brajesh Mishra at the ORF Conference on ‘Iran: Twenty-Five Years After the Revolution’”, March 7, 2004
<http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=53017638>

“Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on Iran in Parliament” February 17, 2006, <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530110843>

“Address by H.E.Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of External Affairs at a Seminar on “India and Iran : Ancient Civilizations and Modern Nations” in Tehran”, November 02, 2008, <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530114337>

“Address by Foreign Secretary at the 3rd MEA-IISS Seminar on “Perspectives on Foreign Policy for a 21st Century India” February 22, 2010,
<http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530115586>

“Address by Foreign Secretary at NDC on ‘Challenges in India’s Foreign Policy’” November 19, 2010, <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530116703>

“Valedictory Address by Foreign Secretary at the ICWA Seminar on ‘India and the GCC, Iran and Iraq: Security Perspectives’” November 21, 2010,
<http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530116713>

MEA Annual Reports can be found here: <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=2702>

MEA Foreign Relations Reports can be found here:
<http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=2703>

Lok Sabha questions can be found here: <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=2202>

MOD Annual Reports can be found here: <http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html>